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In this article the author reviews the pre-
scription drug coverage policy in the
Medicare End Stage Renal Disease
(ESRD) program and examines the rela-
tionship between secondary insurance sta-
tus and the number of medications pre-
scribed for dialysis patients who had
Medicare as their primary payer.  Negative
binomial models were used to examine this
relationship.  Findings in this study indi-
cate that the number of secondary payers
has a significant impact on the number of
prescription drugs received by Medicare
ESRD patients.  Further research is needed
to determine whether Medicare beneficia-
ries without secondary insurance are
obtaining fewer prescriptions than needed
or if those with greater coverage are obtain-
ing more than needed.
INTRODUCTION
Prescription drug coverage in Medicare
is a popular request among the elderly.  To
date, most outpatient prescription drugs
have not been included as a Medicare bene-
fit because of concern over increasing pro-
gram expenditures as a result of such cov-
erage.  Several studies (Mueller, Schur, and
O’Connell, 1997; Stuart and Grana, 1998)
have found that elderly persons with sec-
ondary insurance (e.g., insurance other
than Medicare) are more likely to take med-
ications.  However, the relationship between
secondary insurance status and medication
use among enrollees in the Medicare ESRD
program remains an unexplored issue.
Because of the complexity of permanent
renal failure and the combination of multi-
ple comorbidities in this population, most
ESRD beneficiaries are on several medica-
tions (St Peter, Clark, and Levos, 1998).
Therefore, difficulties in meeting their med-
ication needs may be especially detrimental
to this group of patients.
In this article I examine medication use
in the Medicare ESRD program from two
aspects.  First, I review the current
Medicare outpatient prescription drug cov-
erage policy and discuss problems associ-
ated with that policy.  Second, I explore the
relationship between secondary insurance
status and medication use among ESRD
beneficiaries on dialysis for whom
Medicare was primary payer. 
BACKGROUND
Medicare ESRD Program
Medicare started its ESRD program in
1973 as a result of the 1972 Social Security
Amendments.  The purpose of this program
is to save the lives of persons with perma-
nent kidney failure by covering dialysis or
renal transplantation.  ESRD, like age or
disability status in Social Security, makes a
person eligible for Medicare, if he or she
has paid into the Social Security system for
a certain period of time or is the dependent
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of someone who has paid into the system
for that period.  Any person who meets the
Social Security eligibility requirement and
whose loss of kidney function is certified
by a physician as irreversible is eligible for
Part A and Part B of Medicare.  Soon after
this program became effective, Medicare
felt the financial burden of this program as
a result of increasing enrollment size.  In
less than 3 years, program costs and enroll-
ment both doubled (Rettig, 1976).
Compared with non-ESRD Medicare,
the ESRD program is not only more expen-
sive in terms of per capita expenditure but
also in terms of total expenditures.
According to a recent publication by HCFA
(Health Care Financing Administration,
1995) that identified three groups of high-
cost users of Medicare services, ESRD
beneficiaries topped the list, followed by
non-ESRD beneficiaries who had died or
were hospitalized during the reporting
year.  In 1995 the point prevalence of ESRD
was approximately 257,000 persons, an
increase of 285 percent since 1980; total
Medicare spending in 1995 was $9.74 bil-
lion (Health Care Financing
Administration, 1996; Held et al., 1997).
Both the cost and the incidence of ESRD
have been increasing over the past decade.
Per capita Medicare expenditures for
ESRD patients were $35,154 in 1995, more
than seven times the $4,976 figure for aged
Medicare beneficiaries (Health Care
Financing Administration, 1997).  Even
though spending for the ESRD program
remains a small percentage of total
Medicare spending at 5.8 percent of all pay-
ments, policymakers have been increasing-
ly concerned about cost containment and
quality of care for this population (Health
Care Financing Administration, 1997).
Prescription Drug Coverage
Currently only two independent cate-
gories of outpatient prescription drugs are
covered in the Medicare ESRD program.
One is immunosuppressant drugs for
patients with a renal transplantation.  The
other is erythropoietin (EPO), which is
used to treat anemia in dialysis patients.
The composite rate, HCFA’s outpatient
dialysis reimbursement mechanism, cov-
ers medications that can be bundled with
outpatient dialysis services, for example,
injectable medications administered dur-
ing dialysis.
Medicare eligibility continues for 3 years
after a successful kidney transplant, and the
patient must remain on immunosuppres-
sants for the duration of his or her life to
avoid graft failure.  In response to the 1986
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA), Medicare began covering
immunosuppressants for 1 year following a
transplant.  A 1994 study (United States
Renal Data System, 1994) estimated that
Medicare’s costs in the 3-year post-transplant
period were three times higher for patients
who experienced graft failure than for
patients who had a successful graft, and the
cost of a return to dialysis caused by graft
failure was approximately eight times the
cost of immunosuppressant drugs.  The law
then extended the duration of immunosup-
pressant coverage, on a phase-in basis over
a period of 4 years, so that, as of January 1,
1998, immunosuppressant coverage was
extended for the full 36 months of Medicare
eligibility after a successful transplant.
The termination of both Medicare and
immunosuppressant coverage after 3 years
jeopardizes the health of patients who have
received transplants and who do not have
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other insurance to cover drug costs.
Ironically, if the patient’s graft fails as a
result of inability to pay for immunosup-
pressants, the return to maintenance dialy-
sis makes the patient again eligible for
Medicare through the ESRD program.
Moreover, given the long waiting list for
transplantation and extremely scarce sup-
ply of kidneys, the current Medicare policy
provides only a short-term solution to this
excess demand problem.  Eventually when
patients who have received transplants
experience graft failure as a result of losing
coverage for immunosuppressant drugs,
they may return to the waiting list.
Another problem with the current reim-
bursement policy regarding immunosup-
pressant drugs is the change of immuno-
suppression regimens over the past few
years.  Between 1988 and 1994, the majori-
ty of transplant patients received either a
double therapy composed of cyclosporine
and prednisone or a triple therapy of
cyclosporine, azathioprine, and prednisone.
After 1995 another triple therapy
(cyclosporine, mycophenolate mefetil
[MMF], and prednisone) became more
common (Katznelson and Cecka, 1996).
Though the new immunosuppressive
drugs tend to be more effective in reducing
the risk of acute rejection and complica-
tions caused by infection or adverse reac-
tion, they are also more expensive.  For
example, the estimated annual cost of aza-
thioprine was approximately $1,000, where-
as the annual cost of MMF was more than
$6,000 in 1995 dollars (Sullivan et al., 1997).
Therefore when transplant recipients lose
prescription drug coverage, it becomes
even more financially burdensome to pay
for their maintenance immunosuppression.  
Medicare coverage of EPO began June 1,
1989, almost immediately following its
approval by the Food and Drug
Administration.  Because of the nature of
renal failure and the dialysis process, ESRD
patients on dialysis are particularly suscep-
tible to anemia.  Traditional therapy for the
condition consisted of transfusions of
packed red cells on an as-needed basis.
Androgen therapy has also been used but
not as routinely because of its limited effi-
cacy and other concerns (Watson, 1989).
The 1989 introduction of EPO, a genetically
engineered hormone that raises patients’
hematocrit level by stimulating red blood
cell production (Erslev, 1991), provided a
superior alternative.
HCFA began its EPO coverage by paying
dialysis facilities $40 per EPO treatment for
any dose up to 9,999 units and an additional
$30 for any dose of 10,000 units or higher
(Rettig and Levinsky, 1991).  However, this
payment method was criticized because it
could create financial incentives for dialysis
facilities to administer a lower dosage of
EPO and thereby profit (Office of Inspector
General, 1990).  The payment mechanism
for EPO was changed to $11 per 1,000 units
in July 1991.  In addition, Medicare cover-
age of EPO was initially limited to in-center
hemodialysis patients but was extended to
home-dialysis patients in July 1991.  The
rate was decreased to $10 per 1,000 units in
OBRA 93.  The estimated monthly average
cost of EPO per patient was $420 in 1989
dollars, and more than 90 percent of
patients remained on EPO for at least 6
months (Powe, Eggers, and Johnson, 1994).
Despite the coverage of EPO for dialysis
patients and immunosuppressant drugs for
transplant patients, a major concern of the
Medicare prescription drug policy is
whether the current coverage meets the
medication needs in this population.
Because of the complexity of permanent
renal failure, ESRD patients consume
more medications than other Medicare
beneficiaries.  Several studies have exam-
ined medication use in dialysis patients.
Anderson (1982) surveyed more than
1,000 medical records of dialysis patients
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and concluded that a mean of 7.7 medica-
tions were prescribed.  Grabe et al. (1997)
used pharmacy data from a single dialysis
center and found the mean number of med-
ications prescribed to the prevalent dialy-
sis patients was 10.9.  A recent study by the
USRDS (1998) found that the median num-
ber of medications for patients who were
on dialysis in 1993 was nine.  Pollack and
Pesce (1990) found that from 1978 to 1989,
the average number of medications admin-
istered per patient increased by nearly
ninefold, excluding EPO.  However, no
study has examined the impact of insur-
ance status on medication use in dialysis
patients.  Given that Medicare only cov-
ered two categories of outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs (e.g., a maximum number of
five medications if an ESRD beneficiary
used EPO and a quadruple immunosup-
pressive therapy), it is important to under-
stand to what extent medication needs
were met by secondary payers and
whether the lack of secondary insurance
could put Medicare ESRD patients in a
more disadvantaged situation. 
DATA AND METHODS
Data
This study uses the Dialysis Morbidity
and Mortality Study (DMMS) waves III
and IV data collected by the USRDS to
examine the relationship between insur-
ance coverage and medication use in
ESRD beneficiaries.  The USRDS is a
national data system that collects, ana-
lyzes, and distributes information on the
incidence, prevalence, treatment, morbidi-
ty, and mortality of ESRD in the United
States (United States Renal Data System,
1998).  The data consist of several files con-
taining clinical, demographic, and claims
information for most ESRD patients.  The
DMMS is a special study to collect demo-
graphic, comorbidity, laboratory, treat-
ment, socioeconomic, and insurance infor-
mation for a large random sample of dialy-
sis patients (United States Renal Data
System, 1998).  
The DMMS study contains four “waves”
of data collection over a 3-year period.  This
study uses waves III and IV of the DMMS
for the empirical analysis.  Waves III and IV
are prospective studies of a random sample
of ESRD patients receiving in-center
hemodialysis on December 31, 1993; data
collection was completed during 1997.
Each wave includes more than 5,000
patients.  A special feature of waves III and
IV is that extensive medication use infor-
mation was collected, including identifica-
tion of medications, dose, and frequency
for up to 22 medications.  Information was
also collected on primary and secondary
insurance status of several payers, includ-
ing Blue Cross, other private insurance,
health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), Medicare, Medicare-pending,
Medicaid, Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA), no insurance, self-pay, and other
insurance.  Because this study focuses on
the relationship between secondary insur-
ance status and medication use among
Medicare ESRD beneficiaries, patients
were excluded from this study if their pri-
mary payer was not Medicare or if their
insurance information was missing.   
Methods
Medication use can be influenced by
many factors.  Patients’ demographic char-
acteristics and socioeconomic status, in par-
ticular age and insurance coverage, may be
associated with medication use.  Health fac-
tors, for example, history of diabetes, may
also affect the number of medications.
Because of the nature of kidney failure, sev-
eral health problems, such as diabetes,
hypertension, glomerulonephritis, are
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especially common in this group of
patients.  To examine the impact of sec-
ondary insurance status on the number of
medications among Medicare ESRD bene-
ficiaries, while controlling for other factors
that may also affect medication use, the fol-
lowing regression model is used:
Mi = β0 + β/Xi + γ/SIi + εi (1)
where Mi represents the number of med-
ications prescribed for beneficiary i.  
Xi in equation (1) is a vector of explana-
tory variables, including patients’ demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics,
primary cause of ESRD, health status,
medical history, and dialysis history.
Specifically, age is categorized into four
ranges: under 25 years, 25-44 years, 45-64
years, and over 64 years.  Three binary
variables are used to represent these age
categories in the regression model, using
persons over age 64 as the reference
group.  Race is grouped into white, black,
Asian, Native American, and other, with
white as the reference group.  In addition
Hispanic ethnicity is included as a binary
variable.  Gender is characterized as a bina-
ry variable, using female as the reference
group.  Education is classified into four lev-
els: less than high school, high school
graduate, some college, and college gradu-
ate (reference group).  Other socioeco-
nomic variables include living arrange-
ment and marital status.  Primary disease
leading to ESRD includes the following
causes: diabetes, hypertension, glomeru-
lonephritis, polycystic kidney disease, and
other.  In the regression model, four bina-
ry variables are used to represent this
information, using diabetes as the refer-
ence group.  Three activity of daily living
(ADL) variables (independent eating, walk-
ing, and transferring) are used to charac-
terize the current health status.   Several
variables are used to describe medical his-
tory, including history of smoking, heart
disease, and cerebrovascular disease.  In
addition 16 binary variables1 are used to
represent the ESRD network, using net-
work 18 (Southern California) as the refer-
ence group.  The network variables are
included to capture possible regional varia-
tions in prescription patterns.  SIi are bina-
ry variables indicating either the number or
types of secondary payer beneficiary i had
in addition to Medicare.  β0,β,γ are regres-
sion parameters, and εi is the error term.
Conclusions from an ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation based on equa-
tion (1) may be misleading, as the depen-
dent variables are not continuous.  To esti-
mate the number of medications, two count
data models are used in this study
(Winkelmann, 1994).  The first count data
model is the Poisson regression model, and
the second is the negative binomial regres-
sion model.  Equation (2) illustrates the like-
lihood specification of the Poisson model:
f(Mi)=eβ0 + β
/X i + γ
/SI i (2)
The main criticism of the Poisson model
is the overdispersion problem as a result of
the equal mean and variance assumption
underlying the Poisson distribution.
Alternatively the negative binomial model
adopts more general functional forms to
estimate count data (Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches, 1984).  Denote  Zi = β0 + β/Xi +
γ/SIi and α as a shape parameter, the likeli-
hood in the negative binomial model is:
f (Milµi) =        
1     (µiZi)Mie-µiZi (3)
Γ(Mi + 1)
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1 Because of sample problems, no information from network 10
has been used in the USRDS special studies; therefore only 16
(rather than 17) binary variables are included in the analysis.
where µi follows a gamma distribution.  
Specifically, h(µi) =    
1   µiα - 1e -µi.  Both
Γ(α)
Poisson and the negative binomial models
are estimated using maximum-likelihood
method.  If α, the shape parameter, is sig-
nificantly different from zero, then the
Poisson model is not an appropriate model
in this case.  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sources of Insurance
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of
insurance sources among the ESRD popu-
lation, as categorized in DMMS waves III
and IV.  Medicare was the sole or primary
source of payment for 79.7 percent, and
Medicaid ranked second as the sole or pri-
mary source of payment for 6.0 percent.
Other payers (e.g., Blue Cross, HMOs,
other private or public insurance, or VA), in
aggregate, were primary for 10.5 percent.
Only 3.9 percent had no insurance or were
self-pay patients.
Because the law requires that employer
group health plans remain the primary
payer for a certain duration for persons who
have that coverage at the time they become
eligible for Medicare because of ESRD, 9.4
percent of ESRD patients have Medicare
functioning as a secondary payer.  Of the
patients who had Medicare as a primary
payer, 83.8 percent had a secondary payer.
Patient Characteristics
Table 2 summarizes characteristics of
the Medicare ESRD beneficiaries in waves
III and IV.  The average age was 62.22
years.  More than one-half (51.99 percent)
of the Medicare ESRD patients were white,
and more than one-third (41.03 percent) of
the patients were black.  In addition, when
focusing solely on Hispanic ethnicity, 12.27
percent were Hispanic.  Approximately one-
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Table 1
Distribution of Payment Sources
Medicare ESRD
All ESRD Patients (N = 10,214) Patients1 (N = 8,136)
Source Primary Payer Secondary Payer2 Secondary Payer2
Percent
Total 100.0 113.0 113.0
Blue Cross 2.6 15.1 18.5
Other Private Insurance 3.6 16.1 19.6
HMO3 2.2 2.9 3.4
Medicare 79.7 9.4 —
Medicare Pending 0.1 1.0 —
Medicaid 6.0 29.9 36.4
VA 0.4 0.4 0.4
No Insurance 3.8 — —
Self-Pay 0.1 1.1 —
Other Insurance 1.7 17.1 18.7
No Secondary Insurance4 — 20.2 16.2
1 ESRD patients with Medicare as the primary payer.
2 Because an ESRD patient can have more than 1 secondary payer, percentages in the secondary payer columns sum to more than 100.0.
3 Although HMOs are entities that receive payment from payers such as Medicare and other insurance, in the Dialysis Morbidity and Mortality Study
waves III and IV, "HMO" was listed as a payer type.  It is not clear what proportion of the ESRD patients for whom HMO is given as a payment
source are really covered by Medicare or some other insurance.  At present, Medicare ESRD patients cannot enroll in HMOs, but if they develop
ESRD after enrollment, they may remain enrolled.
4 No secondary insurance is an aggregate of no insurance and self-pay.
NOTES: ESRD is end stage renal disease.  HMO is health maintenance organization.  VA is Department of Veterans Affairs.
SOURCE: United States Renal Disease System; data analysis by Shih, Y.C.T., 1999.
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Table 2
Characteristics of Medicare ESRD Dialysis Patients
Characteristic N = 7,8871















Less Than 12 Years 39.01





Medicare Plus 1 Secondary Insurance Carrier 72.88
More Than 1 Secondary Insurance Carrier 12.16
ESRD Network
1 (01 CT) Network of New England 4.06
2 (02 NY) Network of New York 6.06
3 (03 NJ) Trans-Atlantic R.C. 6.07
4 (04 PA) ESRD Network Org. #4 6.26
5 (05 VA) Mid Atlantic R.C. 6.10
6 (06 NC) Southeastern Kidney Council 9.57
7 (07 FL) ESRD Network of Florida 5.85
8 (08 MS) Network 8 6.71
9 (09 IN) Tri-State R.N. 7.85
10 (10 IL) Renal Network of Illinois 0.00
11 (11 MN) Renal Network of Upper Midwest 5.52
12 (12 MO) ESRD Network 12 4.20
13 (13 OK) ESRD Network 13 4.69
14 (14 TX) Network of Texas 9.21
15 (15 CO) Inter-Mountain ESRD Network 3.58
16 (16 WA) Northwest Renal Network 2.38
17 (17 N-CA) Trans-Pacific ESRD Network 4.87
18 (18 S-CA) Southern California Network 7.02




Polycystic Kidney Disease 3.83
Other 20.26
Activity of Daily Living
Eat Independently 95.04
Walk Without Assistance 65.92
Independent Transferring 79.76
See notes at end of table.
half (50.31 percent) of this population was
male, 19.09 percent lived alone, and 46.94
percent were married.  The majority of
patients had educational levels less than
high school (39.01 percent), followed by
high school graduates (29.39 percent), col-
lege graduates (21.98 percent), and some
college (9.62 percent).  In addition, these
Medicare primary ESRD patients were not
evenly distributed across the ESRD net-
work.  Networks 6 and 14 had the largest
number of ESRD beneficiaries (9.57 per-
cent and 9.21 percent, respectively), where-
as networks 15 and 16 had the fewest (3.58
percent and 2.38 percent, respectively).  
In terms of primary disease leading to
ESRD, the leading cause was diabetes
(34.33 percent), followed by hypertension
(29.99 percent).  Statistics of medical histo-
ry variables showed that 44.4 percent of
Medicare ESRD beneficiaries had a history
of coronary heart disease (CHD) or coro-
nary artery disease (CAD).  For history of
cerebrovascular disease, peripheral vascu-
lar disease, heart diseases other than CHD
and CAD,  diabetes, lung disease, and can-
cer, the percentages were 14.85, 24.53,
43.86, 41.59, 10.78, and 9.43 percent,
respectively.  That is, the most common
medical problems in this group were heart
problems and diabetes.  Among this popu-
lation, 6.55 percent had a transplant before
December 1993.  Because waves III and IV
collected data only for ESRD patients who
underwent in-center hemodialysis in
December 1993, patients with a history of
transplant were those who had experienced
graft failure and resumed dialysis.  Lastly,
the average dialysis history was 7.36 years. 
Patient Characteristics by Secondary
Payer Status 
Table 3 describes patient characteristics
by the number of secondary payers.  In
general, several differences were observed
among Medicare primary ESRD patients.
Older patients and white persons were
more likely to have more than one payer.  A
reversed pattern was observed in the pro-
portion of black persons.  The proportion
of Hispanic people decreased as the num-
ber of secondary payers increased.  Also,
the proportion of males decreased for
those with at least one secondary payer.  
Compared with patients without any sec-
ondary payer, those with at least one sec-
ondary payer were more likely to live alone
or to have a history of heart disease (includ-
ing CHD or CAD, cerebrovascular, or
peripheral vascular disease), lung disease,
or cancer, and less likely to have either dia-
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Table 2—continued
Characteristics of Medicare ESRD Dialysis Patients
Characteristic N = 7,8871
Medical History
Smoke 53.18
Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) or Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) 44.40
Cerebrovascular Disease 14.85
Peripheral Vascular Disease 24.53





Had Previous Transplant 6.55
Years of Dialysis (Standard Deviation) 7.36 (3.79)
1 A total of 249 observations with negative age or dialysis history were deleted.
NOTES: ESRD is end stage renal disease.  AIDS is acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
SOURCE: United States Renal Disease System; data analysis by Shih, Y.C.T., 1999.
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Table 3
Patient Characteristics, by Number of Secondary Payer
Number of Secondary Payers
None 1 More Than 1
Characteristic (N = 1,180) (N = 5,748) (N = 959)
Age in Years (Standard Deviation) 59.66 (18.85) 62.58 (20.19) 63.18 (19.82)
Race
White 46.70 53.06 52.00
Black 45.59 39.82 42.65
Asian 1.19 2.12 1.78
Native American 1.69 1.36 1.69
Other 4.83 3.64 1.88
Ethnicity
Hispanic 17.63 11.67 9.28
Gender
Male 54.75 49.48 49.84
Socioeconomic Status
Live Alone 18.73 18.89 20.75
Married 48.31 46.59 47.34
Education Level
Less Than 12 Years 41.19 38.05 42.13
High School Graduate 26.70 30.25 27.53
Some College 9.66 9.69 9.18
College Graduate 22.45 22.01 21.16
ESRD Network
1 (01 CT) Network of New England 2.12 4.87 1.56
2 (02 NY) Network of New York 2.63 7.01 4.59
3 (03 NJ) Trans-Atlantic R.C. 11.27 5.33 4.07
4 (04 PA) ESRD Network Org. #4 4.41 5.85 11.05
5 (05 VA) Mid Atlantic R.C. 3.56 5.67 11.78
6 (06 NC) Southeastern Kidney Council 14.32 9.12 6.47
7 (07 FL) ESRD Network of Florida 8.22 5.81 3.13
8 (08 MS) Network 8 8.73 5.90 9.07
9 (09 IN) Tri-State R.N. 5.00 8.58 6.99
10 (10 IL) Renal Network of Illinois 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 (11 MN) Renal Network of Upper Midwest 3.56 5.46 8.24
12 (12 MO) ESRD Network 12 1.44 4.02 8.65
13 (13 OK) ESRD Network 13 7.03 4.52 2.82
14 (14 TX) Network of Texas 15.68 7.76 9.91
15 (15 CO) Inter-Mountain ESRD Network 3.22 3.62 3.75
16 (16 WA) Northwest Renal Network 2.46 2.59 1.04
17 (17 N-CA) Trans-Pacific ESRD Network 1.86 5.71 3.55
18 (18 S-CA) Southern California Network 4.49 8.18 3.33
Primary Cause of ESRD
Diabetes 34.82 34.39 33.48
Hypertension 32.80 29.40 30.03
Glomerulonephritis 10.00 11.93 11.47
Polycystic Kidney Disease 2.80 4.12 3.33
Other 19.58 20.16 21.69
Activity of Daily Living
Eat Independently 93.56 95.46 94.37
Walk Without Assistance 69.07 65.59 64.03
Independent Transferring 76.53 80.76 77.79
See notes at end of table.
48 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Spring 1999/Volume 20, Number 3
betes or hypertension as the primary cause
of ESRD, to be able to walk without assis-
tance, or to have a history of smoking.  In
addition, wide regional variations were
observed.  The three ESRD networks with
the highest percentages of ESRD patients
without any secondary payer were net-
works 3, 6, and 14; for those with one sec-
ondary payer, networks 6, 9, 18; and for
those with more than one secondary payer,
networks 4, 5, and 8.  This may be related to
variations in regional programs supporting
or sponsoring ESRD patients.   
Number of Medications
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship
between number of medications and num-
ber of secondary insurance carriers a
Medicare primary ESRD beneficiary had.
The secondary insurance is classified into
three categories: Medicare-only (no sec-
ondary insurance), Medicare + one (had
one insurance carrier in addition to
Medicare), and Medicare + two or more
(had more than one insurance carrier in
addition to Medicare).  As shown in Figure 1,
the distribution of number of medications
shifted toward the right (i.e., more medica-
tions) as the number of secondary payers
increased.  This pattern indicates that lack
of secondary insurance may have a negative
impact on the number of prescription drugs
for Medicare ESRD beneficiaries.  
Similar information is presented in Table
4, where the mean and median number of
medications were calculated by the num-
ber of secondary insurance carriers that
Medicare ESRD beneficiaries had.
Overall, the mean number of medications
prescribed for this group was 8.96 medica-
tions, and the median was 9 medications.2
In terms of secondary payers, 15.4 percent
of these patients had Medicare as the only
payer, 72.6 percent had one secondary
insurance carrier, 11.7 percent had two,
and 0.33 percent had three.  On average,
patients with Medicare as the only payer
had 8.55 (median = 8) medications, com-
pared with 9.75 (median = 9), 10.08 (medi-
an = 10), and 10.11 (median = 10) for those
with one, two, and three secondary insur-
ance carriers, respectively.  That is, as the
number of secondary insurance carriers
increased, the mean and median number
2 Note that because of the differences in sample exclusion crite-
ria, the number of medications used by dialysis patients esti-
mated from this study may be different from that in the USRDS
report (United States Renal Data System, 1998).  The latter
study excludes from its analysis patients who were under 15
years of age, were on home hemodialysis, or had a previous
transplant, whereas this study excludes patients whose primary
payer is not Medicare and those whose insurance information is
missing.  A total of 928 (8.3 percent) observations were deleted
as a result of missing insurance information.
Table 3—continued
Patient Characteristics, by Number of Secondary Payer
Number of Secondary Payers
None 1 More Than 1
Characteristic (N = 1,180) (N = 5,748) (N = 959)
Medical History
Smoke 56.53 52.52 52.97
Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) or
Coronary Artery Disease (CAD) 38.31 45.06 47.97
Cerebrovascular Disease 11.95 15.15 16.58
Peripheral Vascular Disease 21.19 24.95 26.17
Heart Disease Other Than CHD or CAD 41.53 43.70 47.65
Diabetes 41.95 41.68 40.56
Lung Disease 8.81 11.24 10.43
Cancer 6.78 9.88 10.01
AIDS Status 1.02 0.005 0.005
Years of Dialysis (Standard Deviation) 7.08 (3.50) 7.37 (3.85) 7.66 (3.73)
NOTES: ESRD is end stage renal disease.  AIDS is acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
SOURCE: United States Renal Disease System; data analysis by Shih, Y.C.T., 1999.
of medications increased as well.  To what
extent this positive relationship is “contam-
inated” by factors other than insurance sta-
tus is examined in the following section.  
ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Table 5 reports estimates from the nega-
tive binomial model.  Overall, regression
coefficients have the same directions in the
OLS, Poisson, and negative binomial mod-
els (not shown), but are different in their
significance in explaining the number of
medications.  Note that the estimates
reported in Table 5 are the estimated coeffi-
cients in the likelihood function (equation 3)
and therefore cannot be explained as “mar-
ginal effects on the number of medica-
tions” as in the OLS model.  For example,
the estimated parameter 0.083 associated
with the “one secondary payer” variable is
interpreted as “holding other things con-
stant, a Medicare ESRD beneficiary with
one secondary insurance carrier was pre-
scribed 1.0865 (=exp(0.083)) times more
medications than one without any sec-
ondary insurance.”  The low R2 value
(0.06) in the OLS model (not shown) sug-
gests a poor fit of the linear least-square
model.  On the other hand, the extremely
high goodness-of-fit χ2 value (16,323) (not
shown) raises concerns that the Poisson
model may be an inappropriate model
specification.  In addition, the likelihood
ratio test based on α (the shape parameter)
shows that α was significantly different
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Medicare + 2 or More
SOURCE:  United States Renal Disease System; data analysis by Shih, Y.C.T., 1999.
from zero, which confirms that the Poisson
model is not appropriate in this case.
Because the negative binomial model
appears to be superior to the OLS and
Poisson models, discussions of regression
results are based on the negative binomial
regression model.
Two models are used to capture sec-
ondary payer status.  The first uses the
number of secondary payers (e.g., none,
one, and more than one).  The second
model describes secondary payer status by
types of secondary payer, that is, whether
ESRD patients had Blue Cross, other pri-
vate insurance, HMOs, Medicaid, VA, or
other insurance as their secondary payer.
Notice that the binary variables used to
represent different types of secondary pay-
ers were not mutually exclusive because
one person may have more than one sec-
ondary payer.  
Table 5 describes the first model.  It
shows that number of secondary payers
has a significant effect on the number of
medications prescribed.  Compared with
Medicare ESRD beneficiaries who had no
secondary insurance, those with one sec-
ondary insurance carrier had 1.087 (i.e.,
exp(0.083)) times more prescription med-
ications, whereas those with more than
one secondary insurance carrier had 1.103
(= exp(0.098)) times more medications.
Compared with elderly ESRD beneficia-
ries, patients who were under age 25 had
fewer medications, and those 25-44 and 45-
64 years had more medications.  However,
this relationship was significant for the
group age 45-64 only.  Number of medica-
tions prescribed was significantly lower for
males and Hispanic persons, but differ-
ences between white persons and all other
races were not significant.  In addition, liv-
ing arrangement, education level, and mar-
ital status had no significant impact on the
number of medications prescribed.    
The number of medications prescribed
increased slightly but significantly with
years of dialysis.  Among the three ADL
variables, ability to eat independently corre-
lated significantly with more medications,
but independent walking and transferring
did not have a significant impact on the
number of medications.  Compared with
Medicare ESRD beneficiaries with diabetes
as the primary cause of ESRD, those whose
primary cause was hypertension, polycystic
kidney disease, or glomerulonephritis had a
lower number of medications, though these
relationships were not significant.  Among
the medical history variables, positive and
significant associations were observed for
those with a history of CHD or CAD, cere-
brovascular disease, diabetes, and lung dis-
ease.  And compared with Medicare ESRD
beneficiaries in network 18 (Southern
California), those in networks 9 (Tri-State),
12 (Missouri), and 17 (Trans-Pacific) had a
significantly higher number of medications,
and those in network 3 (Trans-Atlantic) had
a significantly lower number.  This finding
suggests that there were variations in pre-
scription patterns across regions.
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Table 4
Number of Medications and Number of Secondary Payers
Number of Medications
Number of Percent Standard
Secondary Payers Distribution Mean Deviation Median
All 100.0 8.96 5.07 9
0 15.4 8.55 4.85 8
1 72.6 9.75 4.58 9
2 11.7 10.08 4.49 10
3 0.3 10.11 4.09 10
SOURCE: United States Renal Disease System; data analysis by Shih, Y.C.T., 1999.
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Table 5
Coefficient Estimates for Negative Binomial Models of Number of Medications
Model Including Number Model Including Type
Patient Characteristic of Secondary Payers of Secondary Payer
1 Secondary Payer *0.083 —
More Than 1 Secondary Payer *0.098 —
Blue Cross — *0.065
Other Private Insurance — *0.061
Health Maintenance Organization — *0.063
Medicaid — *0.072
Department of Veterans Affairs — *0.193
Other Insurance — 0.019
Age < 24 Years -0.017 -0.017
Age 25-44 Years 0.04 0.036




Native American -0.024 -0.020
Other Race 0.032 0.033
Hispanic Ethnicity *-0.078 *-0.080
Live Alone -0.013 -0.013
Less than High School Education -0.031 *-0.034
High School Education -0.035 *-0.036
Some College Education 0.023 0.023
Married -0.001 -0.002
Dialysis History *0.007 *0.007
Independent Eating *0.077 *0.078
Independent Walking -0.01 -0.009
Independent Transfer -0.009 -0.008
Hypertension -0.01 -0.011
Polycystic Kidney Disease -0.048 -0.047
Glomerulonephritis -0.012 -0.011
Other Causes 0.001 0.001
Smoking 0.006 0.005
CHD or CAD *0.071 *0.072
Cerebrovascular Disease *0.054 *0.054
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.017 0.017
Heart (Other than CHD or CAD) 0.028 *0.028
History of Diabetes *0.099 *0.098
History of Lung Disease *0.061 *0.061
History of Cancer -0.006 -0.005
History of Transplant -0.019 -0.008
ESRD Network 1 0.027 0.028
ESRD Network 2 0.017 0.013
ESRD Network 3 *-0.078 *-0.079
ESRD Network 4 0.047 0.050
ESRD Network 5 0.044 0.046
ESRD Network 6 -0.039 -0.042
ESRD Network 7 0.017 0.017
ESRD Network 8 0.007 0.004
ESRD Network 9 *0.082 *0.078
ESRD Network 11 0.061 *0.060
ESRD Network 12 *0.137 *0.136
ESRD Network 13 -0.012 -0.016
ESRD Network 14 -0.001 0.0002
ESRD Network 15 -0.031 -0.027
ESRD Network 16 0.01 0.011
ESRD Network 17 *0.101 *0.103
Constant *2.021 *2.038
α **-2.250 ***-2.251
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
**Significant from likelihood ratio test, i.e., X2(1) = 2314.49, P = 0.000.
*** Significant from likelihood ratio test, i.e. X2(1) = 2311.64, P = 0.000.
NOTES: CHD is coronary heart disease.  CAD is coronary artery disease.  ESRD is end stage renal disease.
SOURCE: United States Renal Disease System; data analysis by Shih, Y.C.T., 1999.
Type of secondary payer, on the other
hand, did not appear to have an impact on
the number of medications prescribed.  In
general, having Blue Cross, other private
insurance, HMOs, Medicaid, or VA as sec-
ondary payer had a positive association
with the number of medications pre-
scribed.  Though the estimated parameters
indicated that such association was
strongest for VA and Medicaid, differences
between either VA or Medicaid and other
secondary payers were not statistically sig-
nificant.  Table 5 also shows that other
explanatory variables in the second model
had similar magnitude as in the first model.
The only difference was that several vari-
ables, for example, being black, having less
than high school education, having a high
school education, or having CHD or CAD,




Findings in this study indicate that the
number of secondary payers has a signifi-
cant impact on the number of prescription
drugs received by Medicare ESRD
patients.  Not only do those with at least
one secondary payer have more medica-
tions, the number of medications pre-
scribed also increases as the number of
secondary insurance carriers increases.  In
fact, a close examination of the estimated
regression coefficients shows that the two
variables representing secondary insur-
ance status were among the top five vari-
ables that had the largest impact on the
number of medications.3 This study also
finds that the impact on the number of pre-
scription drugs did not vary across types of
secondary payers.
The positive association between the num-
ber of secondary payers and the number of
medications implies that Medicare ESRD ben-
eficiaries with Medicare as the only insurance
carrier may not receive a sufficient number of
medications.  Alternatively, one could apply
the moral-hazard theory and argue that bene-
ficiaries with more than one insurance carrier
may receive more than the necessary number
of prescription drugs because insurance can
create incentives to overutilize for consumers
and/or overprescribe for providers (Manning
et al., 1987).  Another explanation for this pos-
itive relationship is that the purchase of sec-
ondary insurance is motivated by the need for
prescription drug coverage.  Whether
Medicare beneficiaries without secondary
payers are obtaining fewer prescriptions than
needed or those with greater coverage are
obtaining more than needed is a topic to be
explored by future research.
However, medication information includ-
ed in this study must be interpreted with
caution.  It reflects the medications pre-
scribed by physicians and filled by benefi-
ciaries, rather than the number of medica-
tions consumed by beneficiaries.  These
two numbers may differ because of factors
such as non-compliance.  Also, in the data
collection process, a maximum of 22 drugs
was collected.  As a result, findings from
this study may underestimate the actual
number of medications prescribed and
either overestimate or underestimate the
actual number of medications consumed.
Several issues related to medication use
in ESRD beneficiaries but not fully
addressed in this study are discussed in
the next section. 
Prescription Drugs Used by Dialysis
Patients
In a recent USRDS study (United States
Renal Data System, 1998), medications
used by hemodialysis patients were com-
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3 The five most influential explanatory variables in the negative
binomial regression models are: (1) ESRD network 12, (2) his-
tory of diabetes, (3) had more than one secondary payer, (4) had
one secondary payer, and (5) ESRD network 9, respectively.
pared with those used by peritoneal dialysis
patients.  Based on this USRDS study, the
following medications were commonly pre-
scribed to ESRD patients: (1) antihyperten-
sives, such as calcium channel blockers,
angiotensen-converting enzyme inhibitors,
beta blockers, central alpha−2 receptor ago-
nists, peripheral alpha−1 receptor blockers
for hypertensive dialysis patients; (2) car-
diovascular medications such as nitrate,
digoxin, and lipid-lowering agents; (3) EPO
and iron for anemic dialysis patients; (4)
endocrine/hormonal agents, including
insulin and oral hypoglycemics for diabetic
patients, estrogen for postmenopausal dial-
ysis patients, and thyroid; (5) nutrition sup-
plements such as calcium, vitamins, and vit-
amin D analogs; and (6) other medications,
including gastrointestinal agents, anal-
gesics, antithrombotic agents, and psychi-
atric medications.  Because relative to
ESRD patients with at least one secondary
payer, a slightly higher proportion of those
without any secondary payer had diabetes
or hypertension as the primary cause of
ESRD, the negative association between
number of secondary payers and number
of medications may present access prob-
lems to hypertensive and diabetic medica-
tions for these patients.  In addition, the
higher proportion of heart disease among
ESRD patients with at least one secondary
payer implies that access to cardiovascular
medication may be less problematic for
those with secondary insurance.
Medication Use and Health Outcomes
The relationship between number of pre-
scription medications filled or consumed
and health outcomes among Medicare
ESRD beneficiaries was not addressed in
this study but should be explored in future
research.  The extensive medication and
clinical information (such as serum albu-
min and hematocrit level) provided in
waves III and IV allows the examination of
this relationship.  However, because the
causal relationship between medication
use and health outcomes can go in both
directions, researchers need to be aware of
the endogeneity problem when studying
this issue.   
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